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his true nature to us and teaches us the (occasionally hard) lessons we need 
to learn as we travel the road to redemption. 
For these reasons (and others), I find Wall's conception of hell uncom-
pelling. But I am pleased to recommend his book nonetheless. For it is a 
thoughtful discussion of a difficult topic, a valuable review of some important 
arguments, and a genuine source of insight. 
NOTES 
1. I have set forth my reasons for believing this in "Punishment, Forgiveness, and Divine 
Justice," Religious Studies. vol. 29 (June, 1993), pp. 151-68. 
2. I defend this claim in an unpublished paper, "Three Pictures of God in Westem 
Theology," Faith and Philosophy. Vol. 12 (1995), pp. 77-94. 
Speaking of A Personal God: An Essay in Philosophical Theology, by Vincent 
Brummer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. Pp. ix and 160. 
$44.95 (Cloth), $14.95 (Paper). 
JOHN GRECO, Fordham University 
The main thesis of Vincent Brummer's book is that philosophical theology 
has an essential contribution to make to the theological quest of faith seeking 
understanding. In the first two chapters of the book Brummer clarifies this 
thesis and defends it against the objection that philosophical methodology is 
inappropriate for the subject matter of theology. In the remaining chapters 
Brummer attempts to illustrate the merits of philosophical theology via an 
investigation of the conceptually thorny claim that human beings can be in 
a personal relationship with God. In these chapters Brummer investigates 
the Reformed doctrine of grace, the ability of God to do evil, the intelligibility 
of double agency, and the possibility of a consoling and morally sensitive 
theodicy. The book ends with an epilogue in which Brummer summarizes 
his conclusions regarding the relationship between philosophy and theology. 
The book is persuasively argued, and almost always a model of clarity. 
Whether one is interested in the methodological or the substantive issues 
treated here, Brummer's book will be found interesting and worthwhile. 
As I have said Brummer treats a wide range of material, but in this review 
I will restrict myself to two main issues. First, I will discuss Brummer's view 
of the nature of philosophical theology and its relation to theological inquiry 
in general, and I will try to resolve what might seem to be an inconsistency 
in Brummer's view of what philosophical theology is. Second, I will briefly 
summarize Brummer's conclusions regarding talk about a personal God, and 
I will argue that Brummer's attempt to provide a morally sensitive theodicy 
fails. 
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The Nature and Role of Philosophical Theology 
According to Brummer philosophy has been traditionally conceived as 
providing epistemic justifications. On this conception philosophy in general 
provides foundations, and philosophical theology provides foundations or 
justifications for our religious beliefs. But such a conception puts philosophy 
at odds with theology. The philosopher demands kinds of justifications that 
cannot be given, and judges faith to be inappropriate as a result. On the other 
hand, the theologian insists that it is the philosopher's demands that are 
inappropriate, and judges philosophy irrelevant as a result. But philosophy 
and theology need not be at odds, Brummer argues, for there is a way of 
conceiving philosophy on which philosophy contributes to theology rather 
than opposes it. Brummer has in mind the model of philosophy as conceptual 
recollection, and argues that this model is to be found in the traditions of 
Plato, Wittgenstein and Gadamer. More specifically, each of these thinkers 
considers philosophy to be a kind of remembering what we already know. 
And for each the purpose of such remembering is two-fold; philosophy has a 
constructive use in supplying insight or knowledge, and it has a therapeutic use 
in helping us to sort out conceptual dilemmas and mistakes in our thinking. 
But in what sense does philosophy allow us to remember what we already 
know? For all of these philosophers this is so in at least the metaphorical 
sense that philosophical reflection makes known explicitly what was pre-
viously known only implicitly. Brummer uses an example to illustrate the 
point. Native speakers can speak grammatically, and so in a sense they know 
the rules that govern the grammar of their own language. Yet such speakers 
need not have any explicit knowledge of these grammatical rules. But al-
though such explicit knowledge is often lacking, having it can be helpful. For 
example an explicit knowledge of grammar can help us to recognize mistakes, 
and can help clarify what we should say in hard cases. And now similar 
things can be said about the concepts we employ in language and thought. 
Although we know how to use our language and employ its concepts, this is 
very different from having an explicit knowledge of how our concepts work 
and how they are related. Philosophical investigation is supposed to yield 
such knowledge, and as a result it can be helpful in clarifying our thought 
and resolving dilemmas and paradoxes which arise therein. 
Whose concepts are the objects of philosophical rel1ection, and to what 
extent is such reflection innovative and not merely descriptive? According 
to Brummer, the philosopher does not analyze only her own concepts, but 
possible conceptual forms as well. "Hence philosophical rel1ection is not 
merely an exercise in recollection, but also, as Husserl tells us, an exercise 
in imagination as well." (p. 19) Also, philosophical rel1ection is innovative 
and not merely descriptive, aiming to produce conceptual forms which are 
preferable to those we already employ. 
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Brummer argues that when philosophy is understood as conceptual recol-
lection, it is no longer at odds with theology but is rather an essential part of 
it. "The task of philosophical theology is not to provide proofs of the truth 
(or falsity) of the Christian faith. . .. Instead the philosophical theologian 
asks semantic and hermeneutical questions about the meaning and interpre-
tations of the faith: what are the implications and presuppositions of the 
fundamental concepts of the faith, and how could the claims of the faith be 
interpreted in a coherent and relevant way? In this sense philosophical 
theology has an essential contribution to make in the theological quest of 
faith seeking understanding." (p. 2) 
More specifically, the role of philosophy in theology is to develop consis-
tent and coherent conceptual forms, and to investigate the relationships of 
these forms to other beliefs that we hold dear. Accordingly, Brummer places 
philosophical theology at the first of three levels of theological inquiry. At 
the first and most general level of reflection philosophical theology develops 
and interprets conceptual forms and determines which conceptual forms can 
be accepted without contradiction. The next level is confessional theology 
or church dogmatics, which uses confessional criteria to determine which 
conceptual forms can be accepted without becoming untrue to the community 
of faith or the religious tradition. The third level of reflection is that of 
personal faith. Here the individual must determine for herself which concep-
tual forms she can accept without losing her integrity. 
It is not obvious how to interpret Brummer here, for there at least seems 
to be a contradiction in the conception of philosophical theology presented 
above. On the one hand Brummer says that philosophical theology operates 
only at the most general level, trying to determine "which conceptual forms 
can be accepted without contradiction" (p.2S), and that the philosophical 
theologian "limits him-or herself to applying general logical criteria rather 
than the criteria of a specific confessional community .... " (p.30) On the other 
hand, there are places where Brummer says that philosophical theology includes 
consideration of the commitments of confessional theology and personal faith. 
"Hence the reflection practised by the philosophical theologian includes an in-
quiry ... into the conceptual grammar of specific views of life .... " (p. 30) 
And " ... in the final analysis the philosophical theologian cannot be satisfied 
with reflection on abstract conceptual possibilities, but must seek to under-
stand those possibilities which he or she can make his or her own with 
integrity. (p. 31) Thus Brummer seems to say that philosophical theology 
does and does not consider the commitments of particular communities and 
persons. 
I think we can resolve the seeming contradiction if we make note of two 
points. First, Brummer makes a distinction between analyzing the relations 
among different commitments and affirming any of those commitments. 
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Thus I can investigate what are the logical entailments of a set of assumptions 
without accepting that the assumptions are true. If we keep this distinction 
in mind, then we can see that philosophical theology involves the considera-
tion of particular commitments in the first sense but not in the second. 
Second, the distinction that Brummer is making between philosophical 
theology and other levels of theological reflection is conceptual as opposed 
to temporal. Thus it is not that we first do philosophical theology and then 
at a later time move on to other levels of reflection. Rather, a person does 
philosophical theology at the same time that she engages in the other levels 
of theological reflection. Clarified in this way, Brummer's thesis is that the 
general theological activity of faith seeking understanding involves philo-
sophical theology as one of its essential dimensions, but not as a separate 
step or in isolation from other forms of theological reflection. 
Speaking of a Personal God 
We may now turn to the second part of the book, where Brummer illustrates 
the merits of philosophical theology by applying it to some specific theologi-
cal problems. All of the problems arise from speaking of a personal God or, 
more specifically, from affirming that humans can be involved in a personal 
relationship with God. The idea here is that this way of thinking about our 
relationship to God raises a variety of difficult conceptual problems. But 
since the nature of these problems is conceptual, philosophical theology de-
fined as conceptual analysis and innovation has an essential role to play in 
resolving these problems. 
To address the problem whether humans can resist the grace of God, Brum-
mer distinguishes among conceptual, factual, normative and rational possi-
bility. He then argues that such a conceptual framework allows us to give a 
coherent formulation of the Reformed doctrine of grace. Next Brummer turns 
to the question of whether God's freedom and omnipotence contradict the 
doctrine of divine impeccability. Making use of some further modal analysis 
and distinguishing free dispositions from necessitating causes, Brummer ar-
gues that for believers it is theologically necessary (de dicto) that Yahweh 
cannot sin (de re) in the sense that He is perfectly and freely disposed this 
way. Next Brummer tries to make sense of the doctrine of double agency, or 
the claim that God acts through created persons. Here he develops a prag-
matic conception of causation in which "X is the cause of Y' entails that, for 
our purposes, X's occurring is an important and necessary part of the suffi-
cient conditions for Y's occurring. In this way it makes sense to attribute 
certain human actions to God, since we can say that God caused the action 
in the sense of providing the most important of the necessary conditions for 
the action's occurring. But we do not thereby deny human agency, since we 
can consistently maintain that the free decision of the human agent is also a 
necessary condition of the action's occurring. 
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The final problem that Brummer considers is the possibility of a morally 
sensitive and therefore consoling theodicy. Here the issue is whether 
theodicies such as the free will defense must always be morally insensitive. 
But Brummer seems to confuse two senses in which the free will defense 
might be charged with insensitivity. First, the problem might be that express-
ing the free will defense is morally insensitive to those who suffer. "[AJrgu-
ments like the free will defense usually fail to offer any consolation to the 
afflicted. On the contrary, such theodicy arguments are often experienced as 
morally insensitive by those who suffer." (p.129-130) But second, the charge 
might be that such a defense entails that God is morally insensitive, since 
such a defense implies that God does not appropriately respond to the suffer-
ing of his people. "In fact, do arguments like the free will defence not conflict 
with the claim that God is a God of love ... ?" (p. 130) 
But whether the charge of moral insensitivity is directed at the theologian 
or her God, it is not clear how Brummer's suggestions are supposed to solve 
the problem being raised. His strategy is to show that the free will defense 
is entailed by the fact that God is a God of love. The main idea is that entering 
into a loving relationship entails making oneself vulnerable to the beloved, 
and excludes forcing an affirmative response from the beloved. "In other 
words, if God did not grant us the ability to sin and cause affliction to him 
and to one another, we would not have the kind of frec and autonomous 
existence necessary to enter into a relation of love with God and with one 
another .... " (p. 144) 
Fair enough, but how is this supposed to help? If the issue is whether 
expressions of the free will defense can be consoling to the afflicted, I do not 
see that Brummer's suggestion is relevant. As Brummer recognizes himself, 
whether a person is consolable will depend on factors external to the content 
of the free will defense. Second, why think that expressions of the free will 
defense should be consoling to the afflicted? Such a stance seems to misun-
derstand the purpose of the free will defense, confusing pastoral issues with 
philosophical ones. 
One might conclude that Brummer is really concerned with the second 
version of the charge of moral insensitivity, i.e. that the free will defense 
invokes a morally insensitive God. But Brummer's suggestions do not seem 
to answer this version of the charge either. The objection that Brummer 
thought compelling against Swinburne's version of the free will defense was 
that freedom, responsibility and the goods that come with them are bought 
at too high a price. Such things are valuable but not so valuable as to justify 
the amount of pain and suffering that we find in the world. But there will be 
an analogous response to Brummer's version of the free will defense. 
Namely, the good of God's love does not justify the evil that comes with it 
any more than the kinds of goods that Swinburne invokes. 
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Brummer's response here is that being in a loving relationship with God is 
not merely one good among others, but is the highest good for human beings. 
Thus he advocates an Augustinian eudaimonism in which the promotion of 
happiness is valued over the prevention of suffering. But here Brummer sets 
up a false dilemma. God need not choose between the prevention of suffering 
and the promotion of love, since both these values can be cultivated together. 
The analogy to earthly parents is helpful here. Suppose that a mother 
considers familial love to be the highest good for herself and her children. 
For this reason she makes herself vulnerable in the ways required for the 
possibility of such a relationship. But she ought not to do so at just any cost! 
Suppose that one of her children persists in doing great harm to his siblings. 
Surely there are cases where a mother ought to withdraw the vulnerability 
required for a loving relationship, if only to protect her other children. My 
point here in not that Brummer's theodicy must fail, or even that objections 
along the above lines are ultimately valid. Rather, the point is that Brummer's 
version of the free will defense does not represent an advance against the 
charge of moral insensitivity. This is because, at least on that point, Brum-
mer's version succeeds or fails to the same extent that Swinburne's does.* 
*1 would like to thank Brian Leftow, Mark Massa and Merold Westphal for their com-
ments. 
